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Factors embedded in health-care systems, stigma, and 
discrimination probably drive these consistent deﬁ cits. 
Solving these issues will need thoughtful application of 
best practices and additional research.5
Antiretroviral treatments for HIV have greatly 
improved with time, oﬀ ering the promise of normal life 
expectancy for people living with HIV who successfully 
navigate the cascade. Yet, in North America, and 
around the world, losses from the various cascade steps 
can jeopardise the health outcomes of many people. 
Jurisdictions should develop metrics of care cascades 
and population-based assessments of HIV viral loads. 
Such data could provide a broad overview of the HIV 
treatment and prevention landscape and point to areas 
in need of improvement. 
In this context, understanding the limiting factors 
in each of the cascade steps is important, with the 
recognition that what causes people to be lost from 
the cascade is likely to vary by region and individual. 
Although it is tempting to use cascades to compare 
countries, provinces, states, and other jurisdictions, 
diﬀ ering HIV care guidelines, clinical practice, data 
reporting, and data availability make such comparisons 
diﬃ  cult. Instead, the value of the cascade lies in its 
ability to guide local programmes and jurisdictions to 
address problematic cascade transitions. 
By following the cascade over time, jurisdictions 
can assess the eﬀ ectiveness of programmes and 
interventions. Nosyk and colleagues’ study is an 
excellent example of the usefulness of reviewing 
cascades of care over time—we look forward to seeing 
more studies of this kind in the future. Shared successes 
will hopefully help the global HIV community to 
improve care worldwide.
Edward M Gardner, *Benjamin Young
Denver Public Health, Denver, CO, USA (EMG); Division of 
Infectious Diseases, Department of Medicine, University of 
Colorado Denver, Aurora, CO, USA (EMG); International 
Association of Providers of AIDS Care, Washington, DC 20005, 
USA (BY); and Josef Korbel School of International Studies, 
University of Denver, Denver, CO, USA (BY)
byoung@iapac.org
EMG declares that he has no conﬂ icts of interest. BY has received consulting or 
speaking fees from Bristol-Myers Squibb, Cerner Corporation, Gilead Sciences, 
GlaxoSmithKline, Merck, Monogram Biosciences, and ViiV Healthcare; and has 
received research funding from Gilead Sciences, GlaxoSmithKline, Merck, and 
ViiV Healthcare.
1 Gardner, EM, McLees MP, Steiner JF, et al. The spectrum of engagement in 
HIV care and its relevance to test-and-treat strategies for prevention of HIV 
infection. Clin Infect Dis 2011; 52: 793–800.
2 Nosyk B, Montaner JSG, Colley G, et al, for the STOP HIV/AIDS Study Group. 
The cascade of HIV care in British Columbia, Canada, 1996–2011: a 
population-based retrospective cohort study. Lancet Infect Dis 2013; published 
online Sept 27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(13)70254-8.
3 Gardner, EM, Daniloﬀ  E, Thrun MW, et al. Initial linkage and subsequent 
retention in HIV care for a newly diagnosed HIV-infected cohort in Denver, 
Colorado. J Int Assoc Provid AIDS Care 2013; published online Aug 20. 
DOI:10.1177/2325957413500532.
4 Cohen SM, Van Handel MM, Branson BM, et al. Vital signs: HIV prevention 
through care and treatment—United States. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 
2011; 60: 1618–23.
5 Thompson MA, Mugavero MJ, Amico KR, et al., Guidelines for improving 
entry into and retention in care and antiretroviral adherence for persons 
with HIV: evidence-based recommendations from an International 
Association of Physicians in AIDS Care panel. Ann Intern Med 2012; 
156: 817–33.
The epidemiology of MERS-CoV 
“The oldest and strongest emotion of mankind is fear, and 
the oldest and strongest kind of fear is fear of the 
unknown” 
Howard Phillips Lovecraft
Coping with, and trying to understand, emerging 
epidemics has been part of the human experience 
since time immemorial. The concern that attends 
the emergence of a novel infectious disease might 
be substantial, but fears often subside as the disease 
becomes better understood, partly because initial 
ﬁ ndings tend to be biased towards cases and case 
clusters with more severe outcomes.1–3 Epidemiologists 
and microbiologists are currently working to better 
characterise the outbreak of Middle Eastern respiratory 
syndrome (MERS) coronavirus infection that made 
its initial appearance in a health-care-based outbreak 
in Jordan in 2012.4 The understanding of the natural 
history and epidemiology of an emerging infectious 
disease allows us to predict its behaviour and identify 
control strategies. In The Lancet Infectious Diseases, the 
study by Simon Cauchemez and colleagues5 is timely and 
important, since it provides us with such information 
about the emerging MERS outbreak.
We were impressed by the extent to which Cauchemez 
and co-authors did their analyses using limited 
publicly available data. Whereas decision makers 
often ask infectious disease modellers to provide an 
epidemiological crystal ball that shows what will happen, 
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these investigators use modelling more appropriately, 
as a method for the quantiﬁ cation and management of 
uncertainty. What does their analysis tell us?
A key epidemiological parameter early in an 
emerging epidemic is the basic reproductive number 
(R0), which describes the average number of new 
cases of infection generated by one primary case 
in a susceptible population.6 R0 aﬀ ects the growth 
rate of an outbreak and the total number of people 
infected by the end of the outbreak. When R0 is 
lower than 1, a sustained epidemic will not occur. 
Using epidemiological and genetic data, the authors 
estimated that R0 was small (consistent with earlier 
estimates),7,8 but might be slightly greater than 
1. However, R0 estimates based on disease cluster 
sizes were lower than 1, suggesting that cluster 
identiﬁ cation leads to application of successful control 
measures. Using data on MERS-infected travellers 
returning from the Middle East, the investigators 
estimated MERS incidence, and back-calculated the 
likely extent of case underreporting; they estimated 
that most cases have been undetected. 
These ﬁ ndings suggest that mildly symptomatic cases 
are common, with implications for the eﬀ ectiveness 
of infection control measures. They also show us that 
the MERS outbreak represents a dynamic process, with 
human incidence possibly portraying transmission from 
animal to man occurring in the context of an as yet 
unconﬁ rmed epizootic.
The distance between the raw, publicly available, 
epidemiological and virological data obtained by the 
authors, and the insights provided by them in their 
report can represent the distance between abundant 
information and actionable knowledge. The quality of 
data available to these authors is poor, but should that 
have prevented them from proceeding with analysis 
until better data were available? We do not think so: 
inferences based on the best available data, even if those 
data are imperfect, allow decision makers to follow 
optimum courses of action based on what is known at 
a given point in time. Could the estimates presented 
here be reﬁ ned if more complete data were to become 
available? Undoubtedly, and it seems likely that these 
investigators and others will continue to do so as this 
disease is further studied.
The widespread, transparent, and trans-jurisdictional 
sharing of epidemiological data in the context of 
public health emergencies could improve the accuracy 
of early eﬀ orts at epidemiological synthesis, such as 
those presented here by Cauchemez and colleagues.5 
However, many disincentives for such sharing by 
jurisdictions experiencing outbreaks remain, including 
lost travel and tourism, concerns about data security, 
and interest in scientiﬁ c publication. Creative 
epidemiologists and computer scientists have shown 
various means to infer levels of disease activity with 
indirect Internet data mining techniques.9–11 The ability 
to draw inferences about diseases from non-traditional 
data sources will hopefully both provide alternate 
means of characterising epidemics, and diminish the 
temptation towards non-transparency in traditional 
public health authorities. The resultant improvements 
in rapid epidemiological risk estimates would beneﬁ t 
all of us.
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